Research Article

Indian Journal of Electoral Studies

Vol I | No 1 | January – March 2026 | page 4–11

One Nation, One Election in India: A Constitutional

Feasibility Analysis

S S Ahluwalia

Abstract: The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) has re-emerged as a major theme in debates on electoral

reform in India. This article examines whether a constitutionally designed framework for simultaneous elections to the House

of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies is legally feasible, institutionally workable and normatively defensible within

India’s parliamentary federal order. The article argues that the proposal cannot be evaluated only in terms of political preference

or administrative convenience; it must be tested against constitutional text, the basic structure doctrine, the logic of parliamentary

responsibility and the practical realities of electoral governance. Drawing on the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous

Elections, earlier reports of the Law Commission of India and the Parliamentary Standing Committee and recent academic

and policy literature, the article identifies the principal constitutional provisions that would require amendment and examines

the associated concerns relating to federalism, democratic accountability, premature dissolution and voter behaviour. The article

concludes that ONOE is constitutionally feasible in principle, but only if it is implemented through a carefully limited amendment

package, broad-based political consultation, safeguards for state autonomy and a transitional model that avoids disproportionate

extension or curtailment of legislative terms. A two-cycle or phased synchronisation model may offer a more prudent path than

an all-at-once restructuring. The article therefore treats ONOE neither as an inherent constitutional threat nor as a self-evident

institutional remedy, but as a reform proposal whose legitimacy depends on design, proportionality and democratic consensus.

Keywords: Simultaneous elections, One Nation One Election, Constitution of India, federalism, parliamentary democracy,

electoral reform, governance.

costs on governance, investment, social cohesion and public

1. Introduction

administration and recommended a phased constitutional

ndia is the world’s largest democracy, but it is also

pathway toward simultaneous elections (High-Level Commit-

perhaps the only large democracy that has gradually

tee on Simultaneous Elections [HLC], 2024).

slipped into what may be called a condition of “perennial

The debate on ONOE has often been framed in sharply

polar terms. Some accounts present it as a transformative insti-

tutional reform that could reduce the frequency of elections,

lower governance disruption and improve policy continuity.

Others view it as a potentially centralising measure that may

blur the distinction between national and state-level political

mandates. A serious constitutional analysis must move beyond

both celebratory and alarmist framings and ask a narrower

question: whether and under what conditions, simultaneous

elections can be accommodated within India’s constitutional

structure.

electioneering.” Elections are, of course, the lifeblood of

representative government; no democrat can complain of

the people speaking. Yet democratic legitimacy does not

require institutional disorder. A constitutional republic

must not only conduct elections fairly; it must also design

the electoral calendar in a manner that serves governance,

public accountability, administrative economy and national

development. The proposal popularly described as “One

Nation, One Election” should be seen in this broader

constitutional frame.

The central idea is simple. Elections to the Lok Sabha and

the State Legislative Assemblies should, as far as reasonably

possible, be held together within a common electoral cycle.

Such simultaneity does not imply voting in every constituency

of India on a single day. It merely requires that the national

and state electoral calendars be aligned so that the country is

not repeatedly placed under prolonged campaign mode and

recurrent administrative disruption. The recent High-Level

Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind

concluded that frequent elections impose direct and indirect

This article approaches that question from a doctrinal and

institutional perspective. It does not assume that the status

quo is normatively ideal, nor does it assume that synchroni-

sation is desirable simply because it may yield e iciencies. In-

stead, it evaluates ONOE against four tests: textual feasibility

under the Constitution, compatibility with the basic structure

doctrine, consistency with the parliamentary form of govern-

ment and practical viability in a complex federal democracy.

The aim is to assess whether ONOE can be designed in a man-

S S Ahluwalia is a veteran parliamentarian, former Union Minister with long service in both the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha.

Vol I | No 1 | January – March 2026

ner that preserves electoral competition, state autonomy and

democratic accountability while addressing the costs of per-

sistent electoral asynchrony.

3. The Contemporary Problem: Perennial

Elections and Interrupted Governance

The case for ONOE begins with the lived reality of the Indian

state. Contemporary governance is repeatedly interrupted by

election notifications, the imposition of the Model Code of

Conduct (MCC), security deployment, redeployment of civil

servants, revision of logistical priorities, campaign-driven fiscal

behaviour and the diversion of political attention from policy

to immediate electoral arithmetic. The problem is not merely

that elections cost money. The problem is that the country re-

mains in a near-permanent state of mobilisation.

2. The Historical Logic of Simultaneous

Elections

The ONOE proposal is often described as radical. Histor-

ically, it is restorative. India’s first four general election cycles

broadly followed a simultaneous model. The first general elec-

tions under the Constitution, conducted in 1951–52, elected

the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies

in one integrated democratic exercise. The same pattern con-

tinued in 1957, 1962 and 1967. In fact, the second general

elections required certain State Assemblies to be dissolved

slightly before the expiry of their full terms precisely to pre-

serve electoral synchrony—an indication that the architects

The HLC’s economic appendix makes an important inter-

vention in this debate. It argues that asynchronous election cy-

cles have consequences that extend far beyond official election

expenditure. Using comparative evidence between simultane-

and administrators of India’s electoral system regarded simul- ous and non-simultaneous election episodes, it suggests that

taneous elections as a desirable constitutional norm rather

than an accidental convenience (HLC, 2024).

real GDP growth at both the national and state levels tended

to be higher in synchronous election periods, while inflation

was lower; public expenditure also appears to shift more to-

ward capital formation under synchronised cycles (HLC,

2024). Even those who contest the magnitude of these effects

must accept the basic channel through which the disruption

operates: recurrent elections increase uncertainty and extend

the cumulative period during which governments operate un-

der behavioral restrictions associated with elections.

The break came later. The disruption of synchrony was

caused by premature dissolutions, unstable governments, frac-

tured mandates and repeated resort to Union Government

interventions in state level governance. The High-Level Com-

mittee notes that the decadal frequency of elections rose sharp-

ly once simultaneity was lost. While the first decade, 1951–

1960, saw 25 elections to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies

taken together, the 1971–1980 decade saw 71 such elections,

a pattern that remained persistently elevated thereafter (HLC,

2024). The same report observes that since 1986 there has not

been a single year without at least one State Assembly election

somewhere in India. That is not democratic abundance; it is

institutional diffusion. The decadal increase in the number of

elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies is

illustrated in Figure 1.

Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai (2017) had earlier argued

that in 2014 the imposition of the MCC and the clustering

of elections substantially interrupted governance for roughly

seven months of the fiscal year. Whether one adopts their exact

estimate or not, the broader proposition is difficult to deny.

When every level of government must continuously calculate

impending elections in one state or another, policy sequencing

suffers. Administrative decision-making becomes timid. Pub-

lic debate becomes short-term. Populism acquires structural

incentives.

The historical point is crucial for constitutional analysis. If

simultaneous elections had been alien to the constitutional or-

der, the Indian Republic could not have operated on that basis

for its formative decades. The original constitutional architec-

ture allowed common terms to function. It was political con-

tingency—not constitutional impossibility—that fractured

the cycle. ONOE, therefore, is not the invention of an author-

itarian imagination. It is an attempt to respond to a constitu-

tional drift that has produced escalating transaction costs.

The burden falls not only on governments but also on

citizens. Frequent elections require repeated mobilisation of

public personnel, schools, security forces and transport sys-

tems. Migrant workers incur travel costs and wage losses each

time they return to vote. The HLC notes that India’s migrant

population may exceed 450 million and that repetitive elec-

toral travel burdens those least able to absorb it (HLC, 2024).

Industry bodies consulted by the Committee similarly argued

that recurrent elections disrupt production cycles and labour

continuity (HLC, 2024). A constitutional democracy must

remain accessible to voters; it need not remain inefficient for

them. The pattern of staggered State Assembly elections in re-

cent years is depicted in Figure 2. The extent of support for

simultaneous elections, as recorded by the High-Level Com-

mittee, is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 1: Decade-wise number of elections to the Lok

Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, 1951–2023.

1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 2011-20 2021-23

Source: Author’s chart based on High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elec-

tions (2024), Table 1.2, p. 14.

Indian Journal of Electoral Studies

Figure 2: The cycle of State Assembly elections, 2014–

2018.

of an “unexpired term” where a House is dissolved early and

provides for fresh elections that fill only the remainder of the

common cycle. The HLC answers this in the affirmative and

proposes insertion of a new Article 82A, together with conse-

quential amendments to Articles 83, 172, 327 and later to Ar-

ticles 324A and 325 for local-body alignment and a common

electoral roll (HLC, 2024).

From an amendment perspective, this is well within the

broad amending power of Parliament under Article 368, sub-

ject of course to the basic structure limitation. The Constitu-

tion has repeatedly been amended to modify legislative terms,

electoral arrangements, federal institutions, anti-defection

rules, local self-government and reservation frameworks. There

is no doctrinal rule that election schedules are constitutionally

frozen. The real legal issue is whether synchronisation would

damage the basic structure by undermining democracy, feder-

alism or the parliamentary system. In my view, it would not.

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Source: Author’s chart based on Chetia (2020), Figure 2, drawing on Election

Commission of India statistical reports.

Figure 3: Indicative support registered by the High-

Level Committee.

80% of 21,558 responses

32 of 47 Par�es

Table 1: Core constitutional provisions impacted by

ONOE

Implication for

Provision

Present position

ONOE

Public Responses

in Favour (%)

Poli�cal Par�es

in Favour (%)

Needs alignment with

a common full-term

framework and the

concept of an unex-

pired term.

Lok Sabha has a max-

imum five-year term

unless sooner dissolved.

Source: Author’s chart based on High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elec-

tions (2024), Executive Summary, pp. 2–3.

Art. 83(2)

4. Constitutional Feasibility: The Core

Question

Would continue, but

President may summon, dissolution conse-

prorogue and dissolve the quences would be

The most serious objection to ONOE is constitutional. India

is a parliamentary federation; can such a polity validly adopt a

synchronised election cycle? The answer depends on how the

reform is designed.

Art. 85

House of the People.

linked to the common

electoral cycle.

State Assemblies have a

Requires a harmonised

The Constitution currently provides maximum terms—

not inviolable fixed terms—for the House of the People and

State Legislative Assemblies. Article 83(2) provides that the

House of the People shall continue for five years unless soon-

er dissolved. Article 172 provides a similar rule for State As-

semblies. Articles 85 and 174 empower the President and

Governors, respectively, to summon, prorogue and dissolve

the legislatures within the constitutional framework. Article

356 allows President’s Rule in extraordinary circumstances. In

short, the existing constitutional design accommodates both

regular terms and premature dissolutions. It is this elasticity

that has over time produced asynchrony. The key constitu-

tional provisions relevant to the implementation of simulta-

neous elections, along with their present position and implica-

tions, are summarised in Table 1.

Art. 172

Art. 174

maximum five-year term rule for full term and

unless sooner dissolved.

mid-term replacement.

Would remain, subject

to the synchronisation

framework enacted by

amendment.

Governor may summon,

prorogue and dissolve the

State Legislature.

Its existence explains

President’s Rule may

interrupt normal state

electoral cycles in excep-

tional cases.

past asynchrony;

Art. 356

ONOE needs rules to

restore synchrony after

such interruption.

Parliament and States

Parliament would need

may legislate on elections enabling authority for

Art. 327 / 328

within constitutional

limits.

consequential legal

changes.

Arts. 324A & Separate local-body elec- Needed in the second

Constitutional feasibility, therefore, does not turn on

whether the present text already mandates simultaneous elec-

tions; it plainly does not. It turns on whether Parliament may

amend the Constitution to create a new electoral architecture

that defines a common “full term,” recognises the concept

325 (pro-

posed/amend- roll-related duplication

ed) persist.

tion management and

step for local-body

synchronisation and a

common electoral roll.

Source: Author’s compilation based on the Constitution of India; High-Level

Committee on Simultaneous Elections (2024), Chapter 10; and Ministry of

Law and Justice (2023).

Vol I | No 1 | January – March 2026

generate a new full-term political cycle? The answer is that

parliamentary responsibility and electoral synchronisation

can coexist, provided the Constitution clearly distinguishes

between a “general election” for the full cycle and a “mid-term

election” to complete the remainder of an unexpired term.

This is not alien to comparative constitutionalism. Several

democracies employ devices such as constructive votes of no

confidence, limited remainder terms or pre-set election win-

dows to preserve governmental accountability without allow-

ing every crisis to unravel the national electoral calendar. In-

dia need not copy any one model verbatim; it must, however,

adopt institutional safeguards against the centrifugal effects of

repeated early dissolutions.

The HLC’s proposed scheme offers one possible response.

If the House of the People or a State Assembly is dissolved

early because of a hung House, a no-confidence vote or an-

other constitutional event, fresh elections may be held for the

remainder of the common term rather than for a full five-year

cycle. This model seeks to preserve the synchronised frame-

work without denying the parliamentary possibility of mid-

term collapse.

Comparative constitutional practice suggests that such

mechanisms are not unusual. Several parliamentary systems

employ devices such as constructive votes of no confidence,

caretaker conventions or remainder terms to reconcile govern-

ment accountability with electoral stability. Whether India

should adopt a constructive no-confidence model is a matter

for further debate, but the broader point is that parliamentary

government does not logically preclude a synchronised elec-

toral cycle.

5. Does ONOE Violate the Basic Structure?

The basic structure doctrine, originating in Kesavananda

Bharati v. State of Keralam, protects the essential identity of the

Constitution. Federalism, democracy, free and fair elections,

judicial review and the parliamentary form are among the rec-

ognised features of that basic structure. The doctrine does not

prohibit change; it prohibits constitutional destruction.

An ONOE framework would not abolish elections, curtail

universal adult franchise, extinguish state legislatures, alter the

representative character of Parliament or transform the parlia-

mentary system into a presidential one. Nor would it abolish

the possibility of government loss on the floor of the House.

What it would do is align electoral terms and provide a legal

consequence for mid-term dissolution: a fresh mandate for the

balance of the common cycle rather than a new stand-alone

five-year cycle. This changes electoral timing, not democratic

principle.

Federalism also remains intact. Indian federalism is not

a confederal bargain under which the states enjoy sovereign

electoral calendars beyond constitutional coordination. Par-

liament already legislates the broad framework for elections

under Articles 327 and 328 and the Election Commission

conducts parliamentary and assembly elections across states

pursuant to a common constitutional structure. The states do

not cease to be states because their elections are held alongside

Lok Sabha elections. Their legislative competence, executive

authority, representation in national institutions and political

pluralism remain untouched.

The stronger objection is psychological rather than doc-

trinal: simultaneous elections, it is said, would nationalise

political discourse and thereby diminish state issues. That is

a question of electoral sociology, not of constitutional valid-

ity. Even here the evidence is mixed and far from dispositive.

The HLC records expert opinion that Indian voters are fully

capable of distinguishing between national and regional issues

and between national and regional parties (HLC, 2024). Ex-

perience across the federal map also shows that voters often

split mandates, punish incumbents at one level while support-

ing them at another and behave with greater nuance than elite

commentary sometimes credits them with. To assume that the

electorate cannot discriminate is to underestimate the demo-

cratic maturity of the Indian citizen.

7. The Federal Objection Reconsidered

No constitutional reform touching elections can be persua-

sive unless it addresses federal anxieties honestly. India is not a

unitary state in administrative disguise. It is a Union of States

animated by linguistic plurality, regional identity and local

democratic aspiration. ONOE must therefore be defended

not against a caricature of federalism but against its serious

normative claims.

Three concerns are usually raised. First, that simultaneous

elections will privilege national parties over regional parties.

Second, that local issues will be submerged beneath nation-

al leadership narratives. Third, that shortening or extending

some Assembly terms during transition would itself be consti-

tutionally suspect.

The first two objections are not trivial, but they should

be stated with precision. Regional parties do not derive their

relevance solely from electoral timing; they are also rooted in

language, social coalitions, leadership networks and state-spe-

cific issues. At the same time, electoral simultaneity may alter

6. The Parliamentary Form and the

Problem of Mid-Term Collapse

A more sophisticated objection arises from the essence of

parliamentary government: ministries survive only so long as

they enjoy the confidence of the House. If a government falls

mid-term, must not the electorate or the legislature be free to

Indian Journal of Electoral Studies

campaign incentives and media attention in ways that advan- parliamentary scrutiny, state-level consultations and transpar-

tage larger parties or national narratives. The constitutional ent rule-making. In a reform of this magnitude, process legit-

response is therefore not to dismiss the concern, but to ask imacy is closely connected to constitutional legitimacy. The

whether legal and regulatory design can mitigate it.

Much depends on institutional safeguards: separate bal-

lots, distinct campaign finance disclosures, clearly demarcated

manifesto requirements, debate formats that preserve state is-

sues and media practices that prevent the complete subsump-

tion of assembly contests within national narratives. ONOE

is therefore best understood not as a single legal act, but as a

package of constitutional, statutory, administrative and polit-

ical measures.

The transition question is more difficult. To establish syn-

chrony, some legislatures may need one-time curtailment or

extension. Any such adjustment would need to be modest,

transparent and justified by a publicly stated transition frame-

work. Excessive or selectively applied term alterations would

invite serious constitutional objection, not only on grounds of

fairness but also because of their potential effect on represen-

tative choice.

timeline of upcoming State and Union Territory Assembly

term completions is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Upcoming State/UT Assembly terms ending

between 2024 and 2028

Year

States/UTs

Term-end dates

Arunachal Pradesh;

2 Jun 2024; 2 Jun

Sikkim; Andhra Pradesh; 2024; 11 Jun 2024; 24

Odisha; Haryana; Maha- Jun 2024; 3 Nov 2024;

2024

rashtra

26 Nov 2024

5 Jan 2025; 23 Feb

2025; 22 Nov 2025

7 May 2026; 10 May

2026; 20 May 2026;

23 May 2026; 15 Jun

2026

2025

2026

Jharkhand; Delhi; Bihar

West Bengal; Tamil

Nadu; Assam; Keralam;

Puducherry

13 Mar 2027; 14 Mar

2027; 16 Mar 2027;

28 Mar 2027; 22 May

2027; 19 Dec 2027

1 Jan 2028; 5 Mar

2028; 19 Mar 2028;

23 Mar 2028; 21 May

2028; 8 Dec 2028;

11 Dec 2028; 17 Dec

2028; 18 Dec 2028; 19

Dec 2028

Manipur; Goa; Punjab;

Uttarakhand; Uttar

Pradesh; Gujarat

2027

2028

8. Electoral Administration, Common Roll

and the Role of Institutions

Himachal Pradesh;

Meghalaya; Nagaland;

Tripura; Karnataka;

Telangana; Mizoram;

Madhya Pradesh; Chhat-

tisgarh; Rajasthan

The feasibility of ONOE is not purely legal; it is administra-

tive. India’s election management system is among the most

respected in the world. Yet synchronised elections on a nation-

al scale would require significant logistical preparation: addi-

tional EVMs and VVPATs, expanded storage capacity, poll-

ing personnel, transport arrangements, security deployment,

training modules and inter-institutional coordination. The

challenge is substantial, but it is not prohibitive.

Source: Author’s compilation based on High-Level Committee on Simultane-

ous Elections (2024), Table 9.2, pp. 244–245.

9. Costs, Savings and the Developmental

State

The viability of ONOE depends not only on constitution-

al amendment, but also on procurement, storage, personnel

training, security deployment, polling station readiness and

interoperable administrative systems. The HLC further rec-

ommends that the Election Commission of India and State

Election Commissions prepare a detailed joint plan and up-

dated cost estimate before implementation (HLC, 2024). This

is a significant institutional point.

Much of the public discussion on ONOE collapses into the

question: how much money will be saved? That question is

relevant but incomplete. Elections are not a burden to be re-

gretted; they are a constitutional necessity. But the manner in

which they are scheduled can either support or impede the de-

velopmental state.

The proposal for a common electoral roll also warrants

careful examination. In principle, harmonisation could reduce

duplication and improve administrative efficiency. Yet the re-

lationship between the Election Commission of India and

State Election Commissions must be structured in a way that

respects constitutional boundaries and operational autonomy.

A common roll should be seen as a governance reform requir-

ing cooperative design, not as a purely technical afterthought.

Institutional trust is therefore central. Any move toward

ONOE would be more credible if preceded by white papers,

The Election Commission’s first annual report as far back

as 1983 recommended simultaneous elections because sepa-

rate elections generated avoidable expenditure, repeated re-

vision operations and prolonged diversion of administrative

machinery from normal developmental work (ECI, 1984).

The Law Commission (1999) likewise argued that the cycle

of annual and out-of-season elections ought to end and that

the rule should be “one election once in five years” for the

Lok Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies. The Parliamentary

Standing Committee (2015) again found merit in simultane-

Vol I | No 1 | January – March 2026

ous elections and proposed a practical two-phase model. The

consistency of institutional opinion across decades should not

be ignored merely because the issue has now acquired contem-

porary political salience.

mentation and improve clarity of mandate. The lesson from

these jurisdictions is not that India should mechanically im-

itate them. The lesson is that electoral simultaneity is a legit-

imate constitutional choice for plural societies, provided it is

backed by clear law and robust institutions (Chadha, 2024).

India’s scale and complexity are greater, but our administrative

capacity is also far greater than it was in the early years of the

Republic. We already manage general elections of astonishing

logistical depth. The constitutional question, therefore, is not

whether India is too complex for synchronisation; it is wheth-

er India is willing to build the legal architecture necessary for

synchronisation. Comparative constitutionalism strengthens

the case for confidence, not complacency. It tells us that if the

constitutional text clearly defines the rules of dissolution, re-

placement, term completion and institutional responsibility,

democratic systems can successfully maintain regular election

cycles without sacrificing pluralism. The structural sources

of electoral asynchrony in India are reflected in patterns of

institutional instability across parliamentary history. As illus-

trated in Figure 4, premature dissolutions of the House of the

People have occurred periodically, disrupting the continuity

of electoral cycles. Complementing this, Figure 5 shows the

trend of no-confidence motions, indicating phases of political

contestation and challenges to government stability. Further,

Figure 6 highlights the occurrence of hung Houses, reflecting

fragmented electoral mandates and coalition uncertainties.

Taken together, these trends underscore how political and

institutional dynamics have historically contributed to the

breakdown of synchronised elections in India.

The broader economic argument has also evolved. Materi-

al presented to the HLC associates synchronous election epi-

sodes with different patterns of fiscal behaviour, public spend-

ing composition and growth. These findings are relevant, but

they should be treated with methodological caution: electoral

timing interacts with many other variables and causal claims

must therefore be stated carefully. Even so, the literature sup-

ports the narrower proposition that election frequency can

generate measurable administrative and economic effects.

For that reason, the case for ONOE should not be reduced

to direct expenditure savings alone. The more substantial

question is whether a less fragmented electoral calendar could

improve institutional continuity without disproportionately

sacrificing federal responsiveness or mid-term accountability.

10. The Social and Moral Case

The constitutional case for ONOE is often supplemented

by a democratic and administrative one. Frequent elections

undoubtedly create recurring moments of political account-

ability, but they also require repeated mobilisation of public

personnel, educational infrastructure and security resources.

The relevant question is not whether elections are valuable -

they are - but whether the existing pattern of electoral dispersal

imposes avoidable costs on ordinary governance.

This issue is especially visible in sectors that rely heavily on

local administration. Schools are converted into polling cen-

tres, teachers and public officials are repeatedly reassigned to

election duty and security personnel are diverted for extended

periods. These disruptions do not invalidate elections; rath-

er, they form part of the constitutional policy context within

which proposals for reform must be assessed.

Figure 4: Premature dissolutions of the House of the

People by decade

2.5

1.5

0.5

Accordingly, the normative debate should be framed in

terms of institutional balance. A constitutional democracy

must combine periodic electoral choice with administrative

continuity. ONOE may assist in that balance, but only if it

does not unduly weaken the representational distinctiveness

of state politics.

1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 2011-20 2021-23

Source: Author’s chart based on High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elec-

tions (2024), Table 9.3, pp. 250–251.

Figure 5: No-confidence motions in the House of the

11. Comparative Constitutional Practice

People by decade

Comparative experience does not furnish a ready-made blue-

print for India, but it does rebut the claim that synchronised

elections are inherently inconsistent with democracy. Federal

and quasi-federal systems have adopted various models to re-

duce electoral fragmentation. South Africa conducts national

and provincial elections together, while municipal elections

follow on a different but regular calendar. Sweden, too, holds

elections to the Riksdag, county councils and municipal coun-

cils on a common date every four years. Indonesia moved to-

ward simultaneous elections in stages, seeking to reduce frag-

1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 2011-20 2021-23

Source: Author’s chart based on High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elec-

tions (2024), Figure 9.2, p. 251.

Indian Journal of Electoral Studies

Figure 6: Hung House instances in the Lok Sabha by

decade

acted on the strength of formal legality alone. Election law has

a special democratic sensitivity and changes to the electoral

calendar affect both competition and representation. For that

reason, any serious move toward ONOE would benefit from

the widest possible inter-party and inter-governmental consul-

tation.

4.5

3.5

2.5

Political consensus may not be total and constitutional

reform does not require unanimity. Yet the closer a reform

comes to altering the rhythms of electoral competition, the

greater the value of broad parliamentary debate, state consul-

tation and public justification. Process, in this field, is not sec-

ondary to substance; it is part of substance.

1.5

0.5

1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-10 2011-20

Source: Author’s chart based on High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elec-

tions (2024), Figure 9.3, p. 252.

Defenders of the present system sometimes treat asyn-

chronous elections as though they were the natural consti-

tutional baseline. That framing is incomplete. The current

pattern emerged through a series of premature dissolutions,

political breakdowns and institutional contingencies rather

than through any deliberate constitutional commitment to

staggered elections. Recognising this history does not resolve

the debate, but it does clarify that the burden of justification

cannot rest exclusively on reformers.

14. A Constitutionally Sensible Roadmap

The most cautious route appears to be the phased or two-step

approach discussed in prior committee reports and reiterat-

ed by the HLC. In the first stage, elections to the House of

the People and the State Legislative Assemblies could be syn-

chronised within a common cycle. In the second stage, elec-

tions to local bodies could be aligned through a separate but

coordinated timetable. This sequencing may reduce institu-

tional shock while permitting administrative learning.

Any amendment package would need to address at least

four matters: the constitutional basis for a common cycle;

the treatment of premature dissolutions; transitional arrange-

ments for assemblies whose terms do not neatly align; and the

relationship between national and state election-management

bodies. The legitimacy of the reform would depend not only

on the text adopted, but also on the proportionality of the

means chosen.

The status quo therefore also merits constitutional scruti-

ny. It may encourage short electoral horizons, repeated cam-

paign mobilisation and recurrent administrative diversion.

Whether those costs are sufficiently weighty to justify reform is

debatable, but they cannot be ignored when assessing ONOE.

In that sense, the constitutional question is comparative:

which institutional arrangement better reconciles democratic

accountability, federal pluralism, parliamentary responsibility

and administrative continuity? A persuasive answer requires

careful calibration rather than categorical preference.

Equally important are the surrounding conventions. Po-

litical actors would need to avoid opportunistic dissolutions

for timing advantage and election regulators would need to

preserve clear distinctions between parliamentary and assem-

bly contests. In practice, constitutional design and political

behaviour would have to reinforce each other.

12. The Judicial Dimension

Would ONOE survive judicial scrutiny? No responsible schol-

ar can predict with confidence how a future constitutional

challenge would be resolved. However, a carefully drafted

amendment package would likely be assessed in relation to

federalism, democracy, free and fair elections and the parlia-

mentary form - all of which are basic-structure concerns. The

stronger the safeguards, the stronger the reform’s constitu-

tional position.

15. Responding to Critical Scholarship

A balanced assessment must engage with the principal objec-

tions in the scholarship and policy debate. Critics raise four re-

curring concerns: erosion of federal balance, nationalisation of

electoral discourse, logistical overload and the possibility that

synchronisation may prove unstable if legislatures or govern-

ments collapse prematurely. These are serious objections and

should be addressed as constitutional design questions rather

than dismissed as merely political resistance.

Courts may also consider whether transitional provisions

are temporary, even-handed and proportionate; whether

state institutions retain meaningful autonomy; and whether

the amendment preserves the possibility of governmental ac-

countability within the common cycle. Judicial review would

thus turn less on the abstract idea of simultaneity and more on

the specific architecture adopted.

At the same time, some critiques assume that the current

pattern of asynchronous elections is constitutionally neutral

or institutionally costless. That assumption is difficult to

sustain. The present system is itself the product of historical

disruptions, repeated dissolutions and evolving political prac-

tice. It also carries governance, fiscal and administrative conse-

quences of its own. The appropriate comparison is therefore

13. Political Consensus and the Ethics of

Reform

Not every constitutionally permissible reform should be en-

Vol I | No 1 | January – March 2026

High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections. (2024).

High-Level Committee report on simultaneous elections in In-

dia. Government of India, Department of Legal Affairs. https://

legalaffairs.gov.in/one-nation-one-election

between two imperfect institutional arrangements, not be-

tween a flawed proposal and an idealised status quo.

The relevant constitutional test is one of proportionality

and structural compatibility: does the reform pursue a legiti-

mate objective, use constitutionally available means, preserve

the essential features of democracy and federalism and incor-

porate safeguards sufficient to prevent disproportionate harm?

ONOE should be judged against that composite standard.

International Journal of Law, Literature and Legal Research. (2024).

One nation, one election: Constitutional feasibility and im-

plementation challenges. https://www.ijllr.com/post/one-na-

tion-one-election-constitutional-feasibility-and-implementa-

tion-challenges.

JETIR. (2024). One Nation, One Election: A constitutional anal-

ysis of its feasibility and impact. https://www.jetir.org/papers/

JETIRGT06020.pdf

16. Conclusion

India has reached a stage in its constitutional development

where the question of electoral timing can no longer be treated

as merely tactical. The problem of recurrent, overlapping elec-

tions has become a structural issue touching governance, in-

stitutional planning and federal practice. ONOE is therefore

a serious reform proposal deserving constitutional evaluation

rather than sloganistic endorsement or rejection.

Jindal Policy Research Lab. (2024). One nation, one election: The

implementation hurdles. O.P. Jindal Global University. https://

jgu.edu.in/jsgp/jindal-policy-research-lab/one-nation-one-elec-

tion-the-implementation-hurdles/

Law Commission of India. (1999). 170th report on reform of the

electoral laws. https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/cat_elec-

toral_reforms/

Law Commission of India. (2018). Draft report on simultaneous

This article has argued that simultaneous elections are con-

stitutionally feasible in principle, but feasibility is conditional

rather than absolute. It depends on a carefully drafted amend-

ment package, a restrained transition framework, credible

institutional preparation and safeguards that preserve the dis-

tinctiveness of state politics within a common electoral cycle.

The desirability of ONOE is correspondingly qualified.

The reform may reduce some of the governance and admin-

istrative costs associated with persistent electoral asynchrony.

The generation that framed the Constitution gave India

universal franchise before it had universal literacy. That was

an act of democratic faith. Our generation must now show

equal faith in the maturity of the Indian voter by giving the

Republic a more rational electoral rhythm. Simultaneous elec-

tions can remove one deep structural impediment to good

governance. For that reason and in the national interest, the

constitutional case for One Nation, One Election deserves to

be carried forward.

elections.

https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/notice/pub-

lic-appeal-draft-report-on-simultaneous-elections/

Lawctopus. (2024). One nation, one election: An extensive analy-

sis and possible solution. https://www.lawctopus.com/acade-

mike/one-nation-one-election-an-extensive-analysis-and-possi-

ble-solution/

Ministry of Law and Justice. (2023, September 2). Resolution con-

stituting the High-Level Committee on simultaneous elections.

Gazette of India.

National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution.

(2002). Report of the National Commission to Review the

Working of the Constitution. Department of Legal Affairs.

https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/chapter%204.pdf

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievanc-

es, Law and Justice. (2015). Seventy-ninth report on the feasibil-

ity of holding simultaneous elections to the House of the Peo-

ple and State Legislative Assemblies. Rajya Sabha Secretariat.

https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_ele c-

tions/79th_Report.pdf

Parveen, W. (2024). One Nation, One Election: Feasibility and

implications on Indian democracy. International Journal of

Emerging Knowledge Studies, 3(12), 1111–1119. https://doi.

org/10.70333/ijeks-03-12-030

REFERENCES

Ahluwalia, S.S. (1992). The Parliament of India: Its role under the

constitution, Constitution of India - In Percept and Practice,

Published for Lok Sabha Secretariat, By CBS Publishers & Dis-

tributors, New Delhi.

Press Information Bureau. (2024, September 18). Cabinet accepts

recommendations of High-Level Committee on simultaneous

elections. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/Press-

ReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2056085

Chadha, S. (2024). Theme paper on ‘One Nation, One Election’.

Indian Institute of Public Administration.

Press Information Bureau. (2024, December 17). One Nation, One

Election. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/Press-

ReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2085082

Chetia, A. (2020). One nation, one election: What it could mean for

India. Social and Political Research Foundation. https://sprf.

in/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/7.2.2020_One-Nation-One-

Election_What-it-Could-Mean-for-India.pdf

Prime Minister’s Office. (2024, September 18). Cabinet accepts rec-

ommendations of High-Level Committee on simultaneous elec-

tions. Government of India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/

news_updates/cabinet-accepts-recommendations-of-high-lev-

el-committee-on-simultaneous-elections/

Debroy, B., & Desai, K. (2017). Analysis of simultaneous elections:

The “what,” “why” and “how”. NITI Aayog. https://legalaf-

fairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/NITI_

AYOG_REPORT_2017.pdf

Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy. (2024). Federalism, democracy and

the idea of one nation, one election. https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/

blog/federalism-democracy-and-the-idea-of-one-nation-one-

election/

Election Commission of India. (1984). First annual report, 1983.

https://www.eci.gov.in/miscellaneous-reports